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## Arithmetization of another formulation of a subsystem of Kaneko-Nagashima's GL

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### Abstract

We propose a system  $G$  of game logic related to Kaneko-Nagashima's  $GL_\omega$ . Our aim is to make the system more constructive than  $GL_\omega$ . Though  $G$  is an infinitary system, formulae and sequents are finitary. We define a Gödel numbering of formulae, sequents and derivations, and we consider some problems concerning undecidable sentences.

## 1 The Language and the Rules of the System $G$

Terms, formulae and sequents of the semiformal deductive system  $G$  are defined in this section. Derivations (proof figures) are defined in a later section.  $G$  has an infinitary inference rule ( $\rightarrow C$ ); all other elements of  $G$  are finitary.

### Symbols.

Free variables:  $a_0, a_1, \dots$

Bound variables:  $x_0, x_1, \dots$

Logical symbols:  $\neg, \supset, \wedge, \vee, \forall, \exists$ .

Modal (epistemic) symbols:  $K_1, K_2, C$ .

Predicate symbols:  $=$ .

Function symbols:  $0, S, +, \times$ .

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Auxiliary symbols:  $(, ), \rightarrow$ .

Remark. Though other functions, predicates may be allowed without difficulty, we confine ourself to this language for the sake of notational simplicity.

Terms, formulae, cedents and sequents are defined as usual.  $S(t)$ , the successor of  $t$ , is abbreviated as  $t'$ .

$(A \supset B) \wedge (B \supset A)$  is abbreviated as  $A \sim B$ .

$\exists x F(x) \wedge \forall y \forall z [F(y) \wedge F(z) \supset y = z]$  is abbreviated as  $\exists! x F(x)$ .

Sequents are defined as usual.

For any formula  $A$ , we define  $K_{i,k}A$  ( $i = 1, 2; k \in \mathbb{N}$ ) inductively as follows:

$$K_{i,0}A \text{ is } A, \quad K_{i,k+1}A \text{ is } K_i K_{j,k}A \text{ where } i \neq j.$$

For any formula  $A$ , we define  $N_k A$  ( $k \in \mathbb{N}$ ) as follows:

$$N_0 A \text{ is } A, \quad N_{2k+1} A \text{ is } K_{1,k+1} A, \quad N_{2k+2} A \text{ is } K_{2,k+1} A$$

Schemata for Initial Sequents:

$$\begin{aligned} A &\rightarrow A \\ \forall x K_1(F(x)) &\rightarrow K_1(\forall x F(x)) \\ \forall x K_2(F(x)) &\rightarrow K_2(\forall x F(x)) \\ \forall x C(F(x)) &\rightarrow C(\forall x F(x)) \\ &\rightarrow t = t \\ s = t, F(s) &\rightarrow F(t) \\ t' = 0 &\rightarrow \\ s' = t' &\rightarrow s = t \\ &\rightarrow t + 0 = t \\ &\rightarrow (t + s)' = t + s' \\ &\rightarrow t \times 0 = 0 \\ &\rightarrow t \times s' = t \times s + t \end{aligned}$$

Inference Rules:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta}{A, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta} (t \rightarrow) \quad & \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A} (\rightarrow t) \\ \frac{A, A, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta}{A, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta} (c \rightarrow) \quad & \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A, A}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A} (\rightarrow c) \\ \frac{\Gamma, A, B, \Delta \rightarrow \Theta}{\Gamma, B, A, \Delta \rightarrow \Theta} (i \rightarrow) \quad & \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A, B, \Lambda}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, B, A, \Lambda} (\rightarrow i) \\ & \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A \quad A, \Delta \rightarrow \Lambda}{\Gamma, \Delta \rightarrow \Theta, \Lambda} (\text{cut}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A}{\neg A, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta} (\neg \rightarrow) \quad \frac{A, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, \neg A} (\rightarrow \neg) \\
\\
\frac{A, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta}{A \wedge B, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta} (\wedge \rightarrow 1) \quad \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A \quad \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, B}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A \wedge B} (\rightarrow \wedge) \\
\frac{B, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta}{A \wedge B, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta} (\wedge \rightarrow 2) \\
\\
\frac{A, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta \quad B, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta}{A \vee B, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta} (\vee \rightarrow) \quad \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A \vee B} (\rightarrow \vee 1) \\
\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, B}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A \vee B} (\rightarrow \vee 2) \\
\\
\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A \quad B, \Delta \rightarrow \Lambda}{A \supset B, \Gamma, \Delta \rightarrow \Theta, \Lambda} (\supset \rightarrow) \quad \frac{A, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, B}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, A \supset B} (\rightarrow \supset) \\
\\
\frac{F(t), \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta}{\forall x F(x), \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta} (\forall \rightarrow) \quad \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, F(a)}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, \forall x F(x)} (\rightarrow \forall)^{(1)} \\
\\
\frac{F(a), \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta}{\exists x F(x), \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta} (\exists \rightarrow)^{(1)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, F(t)}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, \exists x F(x)} (\rightarrow \exists) \\
\\
\frac{\Gamma, K(\Delta) \rightarrow \Theta}{K(\Gamma, \Delta) \rightarrow K\Theta} (K \rightarrow K)^{(3)} \\
\\
\frac{N_k A, \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta}{C(A), \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta} (C \rightarrow) (k \in \mathbb{N}) \quad \frac{\{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, N_k A | k \in \mathbb{N}\}}{\Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, C(A)} (\rightarrow C)^{(2)} \\
\\
\frac{F(a), \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, F(a')}{F(0), \Gamma \rightarrow \Theta, F(t)} (MI)^{(1)}
\end{array}$$

- (1) *Restriction on variable*: The free variable designated by  $a$ , the *eigenvariable*, must not occur in the lower sequent.
- (2) *Restriction will be stated later*.
- (3)  $K$  is either  $K_1$  or  $K_2$ .  $\Theta$  consists of at most one formula.

## 2 Derivations and the Coding

In this section we define *derivations* and the *coding* of derivations simultaneously. Let  $(F_0, F_1, F_2, \dots)$  be an effective enumeration of all primitive recursive functions<sup>1</sup>. First we introduce some total recursive functions and total recursive predicates needed for Gödel numbering.

$\langle a_0, a_1, \dots, a_k \rangle$  denotes the sequence number  $p_0^{a_0'} \cdot p_1^{a_1'} \cdot \dots \cdot p_k^{a_k'}$  where  $p_0 = 2$ ,  $p_1 = 3$ ,  $p_2 = 5$ , ... is the series of prime numbers. Let  $\text{Seqnum}(a)$  be the number

<sup>1</sup>Primitive recursiveness is not essential. For some other subrecursive classes, the argument almost parallels.

theoretic predicate denoting that  $a$  is a sequence number. Definition is

$$\text{Seqnum}(a) \sim a > 0 \wedge \exists k < a \forall i < a [p_i | a \sim i < k].$$

We define  $[a]_i = (\mu x < a \neg (p_i x | a)) \div 1$  and  $\text{lh}(a) = \sum_{i < a} \text{sg}([a]_i)$ . If  $a = \langle a_0, a_1, \dots, a_k \rangle$  then  $\text{lh}(a) = k'$  and  $[a]_i = a_i$  for any  $i < \text{lh}(a)$ .

Note.  $[a]_i = (a)_i \div 1$ .

For any two sequence numbers  $a = \langle a_0, \dots, a_k \rangle$  and  $b = \langle b_0, \dots, b_l \rangle$ , let

$$a * b = \langle a_0, \dots, a_k, b_0, \dots, b_l \rangle.$$

We assign Gödel numbers to the symbols and the names of inference rules. The Gödel number of any symbol  $\#$  is denoted as  $\ulcorner \# \urcorner$  and similarly for the names of inference rules.

Successive odd numbers ( $\geq 3$ ) are assigned to the symbols and the names of inference rules: 0,  $S$ ,  $+$ ,  $\times$ ,  $=$ ,  $\neg$ ,  $\supset$ ,  $\wedge$ ,  $\vee$ ,  $\forall$ ,  $\exists$ ,  $K_1$ ,  $K_2$ ,  $C$ ,  $\longrightarrow$ ,  $(t \rightarrow)$ ,  $(\rightarrow t)$ ,  $(c \rightarrow)$ ,  $(\rightarrow c)$ ,  $(i \rightarrow)$ ,  $(\rightarrow i)$ ,  $(\text{cut})$ ,  $(\neg \rightarrow)$ ,  $(\rightarrow \neg)$ ,  $(\wedge \rightarrow 1)$ ,  $(\wedge \rightarrow 2)$ ,  $(\rightarrow \wedge)$ ,  $(\vee \rightarrow)$ ,  $(\rightarrow \vee 1)$ ,  $(\rightarrow \vee 2)$ ,  $(\supset \rightarrow)$ ,  $(\rightarrow \supset)$ ,  $(\forall \rightarrow)$ ,  $(\rightarrow \forall)$ ,  $(\exists \rightarrow)$ ,  $(\rightarrow \exists)$ ,  $(K \rightarrow K)$ ,  $(C \rightarrow)$ ,  $(\rightarrow C)$ ,  $(\text{MI})$ ,  $a_k$  ( $k = 0, 1, \dots$ ),  $x_k$  ( $k = 0, 1, \dots$ ). For example,  $\ulcorner + \urcorner = 7$  and  $\ulcorner (\text{cut}) \urcorner = 45$ .

Gödel numbers of terms and formulae are defined as usual. The Gödel number of a formal expression  $E$  is denoted as  $\ulcorner E \urcorner$ . The Gödel number of a sequent

$$A_1, A_2, \dots, A_k \longrightarrow B_1, B_2, \dots, B_m$$

is

$$\langle \ulcorner \rightarrow \urcorner, \langle \ulcorner A_1 \urcorner, \ulcorner A_2 \urcorner, \dots, \ulcorner A_k \urcorner \rangle, \langle \ulcorner B_m \urcorner, \dots, \ulcorner B_2 \urcorner, \ulcorner B_1 \urcorner \rangle \rangle.$$

We omit "the Gödel number of" if no confusions are likely to occur. For instance, we say " $a$  is a formula" instead of " $a$  is the Gödel number of a formula".

Let  $\text{Formula}(a)$  be a number theoretic predicate meaning that  $a$  is a formula. Now we define

$$\begin{aligned} N(\ulcorner A \urcorner, k) &= \ulcorner N_k(A) \urcorner, \\ \text{Cedent}(a) &\sim \text{Seqnum}(a) \wedge \forall i < \text{lh}(a) \text{Formula}([a]_i), \\ \text{Sequent}(a) &\sim \text{lh}(a) = 3 \wedge \\ &\quad \wedge [a]_0 = \ulcorner \rightarrow \urcorner \wedge \text{Cedent}([a]_1) \wedge \text{Cedent}([a]_2). \end{aligned}$$

Let  $\text{InitialSequent}(a)$  be a number theoretic predicate meaning that  $a$  is an initial sequent.

Let  $\text{Infer}_1(j, b, a_1)$  or  $\text{Infer}_2(j, b, a_1, a_2)$  be the number theoretic predicate meaning that

$$\frac{a_1}{b} (j) \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{a_1 \ a_2}{b} (j)$$

is an instance of a one-premise or two-premise inference rule respectively.

**Definition 1** We define derivation and its Gödel number simultaneously by induction.

(1) If  $S$  is an initial sequent, then  $S$  is a derivation of  $S$  with the Gödel number  $\langle 0, \ulcorner S \urcorner \rangle$ .

(2) If  $\mathcal{H}_1$  is a derivation of a sequent  $S_1$  and

$$\frac{S_1}{S} (J)$$

is an instance of a one-premise inference rule, then

$$\frac{\mathcal{H}_1}{S} (J)$$

is a derivation of  $S$  with the Gödel number  $\langle \ulcorner (J) \urcorner, \ulcorner S \urcorner, \ulcorner \mathcal{H}_1 \urcorner \rangle$ .

(3) If  $\mathcal{H}_1$  is a derivation of a sequent  $S_1$ ,  $\mathcal{H}_2$  is a derivation of a sequent  $S_2$  and

$$\frac{S_1 \quad S_2}{S} (J)$$

is an instance of a two-premise inference rule, then

$$\frac{\mathcal{H}_1 \quad \mathcal{H}_2}{S} (J)$$

is a derivation of  $S$  with the Gödel number  $\langle \ulcorner (J) \urcorner, \ulcorner S \urcorner, \ulcorner \mathcal{H}_1 \urcorner, \ulcorner \mathcal{H}_2 \urcorner \rangle$ .

(4) If  $\mathcal{H}_k$  is a derivation of a sequent  $S_k$  for each  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  and if

$$\frac{S_0 \quad S_1 \quad \cdots}{S} (\rightarrow C)$$

is an instance of the rule  $(\rightarrow C)$ , and if  $\ulcorner \mathcal{H}_k \urcorner$  is a primitive recursive function  $F_e(k)$  of  $k$ , then

$$\frac{\mathcal{H}_0 \quad \mathcal{H}_1 \quad \cdots}{S} (\rightarrow C)$$

is a derivation of  $S$  with the Gödel number  $\langle \ulcorner (\rightarrow C) \urcorner, \ulcorner S \urcorner, e \rangle$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 1** The nonmodal fragment  $G_0$  of  $G$  is the first order arithmetic.  $\square$

**Theorem 2**  $G$  is conservative over  $G_0$ .  $\square$

**Proof (outline).** Let  $\mathcal{H}$  be a derivation of a nonmodal sequent  $S$ . Delete all modal symbols  $K_1, K_2, C$  from  $\mathcal{H}$ . For every occurrences of  $(\rightarrow C)$  in  $\mathcal{H}$ , delete all premises but the leftmost one.  $\square$

**Corollary 3** Any undecidable sentence in  $G_0$  is undecidable in  $G$ .  $\square$

**Problem 4** What is the relation between  $G$  and Kaneko-Nagashima's  $GL_\omega$ ? Is primitive recursively restricted  $GL_\omega$  conservative over  $G$ ?

**Problem 5** Construct a semantics for  $G$ .

### 3 Undecidability

Let  $\text{prov}(a, b)$  be a number theoretic predicate denoting “ $a$  is a derivation of a sequent  $b$ ”. This predicate is inductively defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prov}(a, b) &\sim [a = \langle 0, b \rangle \wedge \text{InitialSequent}(b)] \vee \\ &\vee (\exists j, u, x < a)[a = \langle j, b, u \rangle \wedge \text{Infer}_1(j, b, x) \wedge \text{prov}(u, x)] \vee \\ &\vee (\exists j, u, v, x, y < a)[a = \langle j, b, u, v \rangle \wedge \\ &\quad \wedge \text{Infer}_2(j, b, x, y) \wedge \text{prov}(u, x) \wedge \text{prov}(v, y)] \vee \\ &\vee (\exists e, x, u, v < a)[a = \langle \ulcorner \neg \rightarrow C \urcorner, b, e \rangle \wedge b = \langle \ulcorner \neg \rightarrow \urcorner, u, v \rangle \wedge \\ &\quad \wedge \text{Cedent}(u) \wedge \text{Cedent}(v) \wedge \text{Formula}(x) \wedge \text{lh}(v) > 0 \wedge \\ &\quad \wedge [v]_0 = \langle \ulcorner C \urcorner, x \rangle \wedge \\ &\quad \wedge \forall k (\text{prov}(F_e(k), [F_e(k)]_1) \wedge [[F_e(k)]_1]_2]_0 = N(x, k))] \end{aligned}$$

**Conjecture 6** *The predicate  $\text{prov}(a, b)$  is  $\Pi_1$ .  $\square$*

Let  $\text{prov}_F(a, b)$  be a number theoretic predicate denoting “ $a$  is a derivation of a formula  $b$ ”:

$$\text{prov}_F(a, b) \sim \text{Formula}(b) \wedge \text{prov}(a, \langle \ulcorner \neg \rightarrow \urcorner, \langle \rangle, \langle b \rangle \rangle).$$

**Conjecture 7** *The predicate  $\text{prov}_F(a, b)$  is  $\Pi_1$ .  $\square$*

**Problem 8** *Is the predicate  $\text{prov}_F(a, b)$  proper  $\Pi_1$ ?  $\square$*

**Problem 9** *Is the predicate  $\text{prov}_F(a, b)$  numeralwise expressible in  $G$ ?  $\square$*

**Theorem 10** *If  $G$  is  $\omega$ -consistent and if  $\text{prov}_F$  is  $\Pi_1$ , an undecidable sentence can be constructed from  $\text{prov}_F$ .  $\square$*

**Proof.** Case 1: The predicate  $\text{prov}_F$  is numeralwise expressible. The argument is similar to Gödel's. Let  $P(u, v)$  be a formula numeralwise expressing  $\text{prov}_F$ . By diagonalization lemma, there exists a sentence  $A$  satisfying

$$\vdash A \sim \neg \exists x P(x, \ulcorner A \urcorner).$$

(i) Proof of  $\not\vdash A$ . If there is a derivation  $\mathcal{H}$  of  $A$ , then  $\text{prov}_F(\ulcorner \mathcal{H} \urcorner, \ulcorner A \urcorner)$ , hence  $\vdash P(\ulcorner \mathcal{H} \urcorner, \ulcorner A \urcorner)$ , hence  $\vdash \exists x P(x, \ulcorner A \urcorner)$ .

On the other hand,  $\vdash A$  implies  $\vdash \neg \exists x P(x, \ulcorner A \urcorner)$ . This contradicts the consistency of  $G$ .

(ii) Proof of  $\not\vdash \neg A$ . The result  $\not\vdash A$  implies that  $\text{prov}_F(m, \ulcorner A \urcorner)$  for no  $m$ . By numeralwise expressibility,  $\vdash \neg P(\bar{m}, \ulcorner A \urcorner)$  for all  $m$ . Since  $G$  is  $\omega$ -consistent,  $\not\vdash \neg \forall x \neg P(x, \ulcorner A \urcorner)$ , i. e.  $\not\vdash \exists x P(x, \ulcorner A \urcorner)$ . Hence  $\not\vdash \neg A$  by the definition of  $A$ .

Case 2: The predicate  $\text{prov}_F$  is not numeralwise expressible. Because  $\text{prov}_F$  is  $\Pi_1$ , there exists a total recursive predicate  $R$  such that

$$\text{prov}_F(a, b) \sim \forall x R(a, b, x).$$

Since  $R$  is numeralwise expressible, there exists a formula  $R(u, v, w)$  numeralwise expressing  $R$ . Since  $\text{prov}_F$  is not numeralwise expressed by  $\forall x R(u, v, x)$ , there exists  $a$  and  $b$  satisfying

$$\text{either} \quad \text{prov}_F(a, b) \quad \text{and} \quad \not\vdash \forall x R(\bar{a}, \bar{b}, x)$$

$$\text{or} \quad \neg \text{prov}_F(a, b) \quad \text{and} \quad \not\vdash \neg \forall x R(\bar{a}, \bar{b}, x).$$

If the latter holds, there exists a  $c$  such that  $\neg R(a, b, c)$ . Therefore  $\vdash \neg R(\bar{a}, \bar{b}, \bar{c})$  by numeralwise expressibility of  $R$ , hence  $\vdash \neg \forall x R(\bar{a}, \bar{b}, x)$ , a contradiction. Therefore we have

$$\text{prov}_F(a, b) \quad \text{and} \quad \not\vdash \forall x R(\bar{a}, \bar{b}, x)$$

for some  $a$  and  $b$ . Hence  $R(a, b, c)$  for every  $c$ , hence  $\vdash R(\bar{a}, \bar{b}, \bar{c})$  for every  $c$ . By the  $\omega$ -consistency of  $G$ , this implies

$$\not\vdash \neg \forall x R(\bar{a}, \bar{b}, x). \quad \square$$

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